Allister reviews Powell's Peace Process History
09 April 2008
An inescapable conclusion from Jonathan Powell’s book on “the Peace Process” is the wholesale lack of morality which characterised government dealings with the terrorist IRA. With barely a passing thought of how heinous were the crimes committed by the IRA, Powell’s dedication was to do whatever it took to keep them on board. Even when IRA/Sinn Fein reverted to fresh episodes of terror, it barely caused a flicker in the full thrust engagement with physical force republicanism. It is also striking just how much Powell and company were at the beck and call of Adams and McGuinness. Scores of meetings took place, as and when sought; such was the dedication to keeping Sinn Fein sweet.
A peace process built on such desperate pandering to terrorists in time created a climate where even those most hostile to republican terrorism, themselves embraced positions which at the outset they had eschewed, not least on moral and principled grounds. By the end of it all, even for them, that which was morally wrong was politically right. Never having been bothered by such a restraint, Powell himself was always ahead of the game. As an intriguing insight into how government diplomacy works, how ambiguity and double speak is the order of the day, this book is a most informative read.
I certainly learned a great deal more from the book about what the DUP was doing in the negotiations than I ever knew as a DUP Party Officer. I expect most DUP Executive Members will be as surprised as I was to discover from Powell that before the Party Executive’s key meeting on 24 March 2007, the two Paisleys, Peter Robinson and Nigel Dodds had agreed with the Government that the DUP would meet face-to-face with Sinn Fein later that day. Certainly such a plan was carefully concealed from the Party Executive as was a back channel with Sinn Fein, which Powell claims existed from 2004, even though publicly the Party was threatening expulsion of any member who talked to Sinn Fein. Powell refuses to name those involved with the back channel but claims it produced such “results” as the DUP amending the policing motion which went before Sinn Fein’s Ard Chomhairle and reassuring Sinn Fein that the DUP’s real stance was softer than proclaimed!
The book contains many tantalising insights into the Government’s all-seeing control. None more so than the account of Ian Paisley reacting badly to Sinn Fein’s Ard Fheis, where they talked about “putting manners on the police”. Powell says they “heard” Paisley was preparing to put out a negative statement calling the whole thing a “confidence trick” (the closest he’d come to the mark in a long time). Tony phoned to try and stop him, but Paisley said he had already put out the statement. Powell writes, “Fortunately, since we knew the statement had not, in fact, gone out we managed to put some spokes in the wheels to stop it damaging what was otherwise a momentous day.” How did the Government know such a statement was intended but hadn’t in fact already gone out? Was it the ability to monitor outgoing DUP emails or co-operation from someone within the DUP which stood them in good stead? Just which channel was in play? As to the spokes which Powell managed to put in the wheels, we are left to speculate.
This blip from Paisley was the only time he gave Tony’s crew any trouble. The overwhelming message from Powell is that the Leader was by far the most eager in the DUP camp for power sharing with IRA/Sinn Fein. He regretted the opportunity lost by the Northern Bank robbery, at St Andrews he was ready for a January election, he was willing to use a government form of words to amount to designation as First Minister on 24th November 2006 and he was up for government by 26th March, when others sought delay. The picture which emerges of Ian Paisley as a negotiator is unflattering, with references to him being flattered by the PM’s attention and phone calls from Bush. Likewise, at private meetings Powell claims more flexibility from Paisley than he ventured in front of colleagues. I have long held the view that Ulster was ill-served by the series of one-to-one meetings between Blair and the DUP leader. What I hadn’t heard till now is the allegation by Powell that it was Robinson and Dodds who actually suggested this stratagem. Odd, considering that I often heard them complain about such meetings.
A distinct pattern emerges in the Government approach. Hot house negotiations are preferred to put on the pressure; suggested texts are withheld till the last minute; confidential comfort letters are despatched to each side to smooth difficult issues – like the last minute, still unpublished, letter from Blair to Sinn Fein on the Irish Language Act on the morning Paisley first met Adams; agreement kept to ambiguous texts capable of differing interpretations and, if necessary, resort to what Powell calls political blackmail by orchestrating such events as water charges, RPA reform and educational changes. Such is the grubby politics that brought us what Powell sees as the triumph of unrepentant terrorists at the heart of government.
